Is genetic engineering permissible when applied to human beings, or, even more, at least in some cases obligatory, or rather it has to be forbidden? Some authors, in particular in the utilitarian tradition, have a very positive attitude toward genetic engineering. John Harris, for example, finds it not only tolerable, but also admirable in some cases (of course, the discussion is in the greatest part only virtual, because most of the imaginable application of genetic engineering are at the moment not possible). Some of his arguments Are by analogy. The first one is related to the permissibility of applying genetic engineering. Harris says that it is a common accepted idea that parents can decide about the school of their children and their education. They can decide to support more some of the children’s talents. In this way it is permitted to them to shape the children’s personality, or at least to influence heavily its formation. Why the same rights would be denied if parents make use of genetic engineering instead of education?

The second argument supports the idea that sometimes the application of genetic engineering is not only permissible but also a duty. Imagine a school which students improve in the best of all possible ways both their physical as well as the mental abilities. Almost everybody would like his or her daughter or son to be a student in this school. Parents that have the possibility to send their child in this school and don’t do this surely fail in a duty they have as parents. Imagine also that it is possible to realize the same goals by genetic engineering. Where is the difference? Why the parents are expected to follow the indicated goals by education, but not by genetic engineering? The conclusion is that not only it is permissible to apply genetic engineering in order to develop general abilities (which is sometimes a parents’ duty), but it can be applied for particular talents, too. Obviously, for Harris, who’s a utilitarian, it doesn’t matter the way some goals are obtained, what matters is only good consequences. If it’s generally accepted that come consequences are good when realized by education, the judgment must be the same independently of the means that are used.

It might be possible to reply to Harris’ argumentation in two ways. The first one is consequentialist. In this case it is denied that genetic engineering is a good way to arrive at the same goals followed by education. The second strategy is deontologic. It denies the permissibility of genetic engineering independently of the consequences, and speaks about duty and rights (the paradigmatic case - in relation to a great number of cases of application of genetic engineering - is the catholic doctrine). I’ll discuss genetic engineering from the standpoint of a deontological liberal proposal, that of Bruce Ackerman.

Ackerman, being part of the liberal tradition of political thought, says that each member of the political society must be allowed to choose his or her system of goals and values by himself or herself. This statement is relevant to the topic of genetic engineering because genetic manipulations are an example of choice of goals and values that will be obtained or affirmed in the future (by changing people we can choose that the future world will be a world of affirmation of music talent, or sport talent, etc.) There are two different problems. The first is whether the society can choose the values for the future members of the society, the second is whether a family can choose the values for its future members. The answer to both questions has to start from the determination of who are the members of the political society, i.e. who are the individuals with rights. The premise of Ackerman’s argumentation is that only those individuals that can actually be part of the dialogical and behavioral exchanges in a society have rights. Therefore, embryos have not to be considered while deciding whether genetic engineering is permissible (even though, as we shall see, wishes of the future persons - or in Ackerman’s terminology, citizens - have to be considered). What follows when we consider the opinions of actual citizens?

Nobody is allowed to enforce a system of values if he or she had not convinced all other people, in a free dialogical exchange, about the acceptability of it. Therefore, a public genetic policy will be legitimate only if there is a general consensus about it. If there were citizens who privilege sport to music (and if the talents for these two activities were not compatible) it would not be acceptable to organize a public genetic policy which reproduces only talents for music. The positive rule is: a public genetic policy would be permissible, if and only if there would be a general consensus about the desirability of undesirability of some features. This shows that in a liberal society there will not be the danger of uniformity as a result of a public genetic policy. All the differences in tastes that exist in the present society will be reproduced in the features of future humans.

What about families? Do they have a right to choose for their children? Some of the liberal instincts will be directed toward a positive answer. Only the state could be a menace, families must have the possibility to exercise their free choice. But Ackerman doesn’t think that the solution is as simple. It is true that embryos do not have rights, therefore they can’t represent an obstacle to parents choice. However, the future person, the future adult human that will be part of all the dialogical and behavioral exchanges in a society, will have rights. The parents will have the duty to explain their choices to the future citizen. Imagine that they decided that he or she is going to be a wonderful sportiest. On the other hand, he could prefer to be an actor, and she a model. His or her frustrated ambition would be a good reason for him or her to say to the parents that they made an injustice. It would be preferable to leave the determination of the features of the future citizen to natural coincidence. In this case at least he or she will have a probability (not reduced by anybody) to have the desired talents, and will not have the future determined by anybody’s will.

I find two incompatible attitudes in Ackerman’s argumentation. He accepts the principle that it’s not permissible to enforce a choice of values against any member of the society, i.e. that the society can’t accept a genetic project against the will even of a single member, but he also permits that the society decides about a program of genetic modifications if there is a consensus among all its actual members. This is not compatible with the reasons Ackerman gives for denying the right to choice in matters of genetic project for families. The role of the future citizen is relevant in one case (the choice of the families) and not in the other (the choice of the society). If in the former case the possible protests made in the future by genetically modified members count (as it must be, in accordance to the fundamental premise of Ackerman’s theory of justice), the same must be in relation to the choice made by the society. Therefore, in deciding whether to permit some choices to the society, Ackerman must consider not only the consensus among the actual members of the society but also the agreement of the future members.

Let’s explain by examples. Let’s imagine that a whole generation of citizens agrees that sport is not a good thing, therefore the decision is to delete in the future generations the genes that give us talents for sports. In this case, according to Ackerman’s argumentation, it would be acceptable to project a generation without sport talents. But imagine also that a member of the future generation admires very much Ronaldo (after he saw him on some old tape) and wants to be similar to him. According to Ackerman’s statement he has not the right to protest.

Imagine a family where the parents think that sport is not admirable at all. They project their child without sport talents, and with genetic predisposition for music. But similarly to the child in the previous example, this child admires Christian Vieri and wants to be a football star. He has the right to protest, because he suffers from an injustices.

I find incompatible to say that there is an injustice in one case and not in the other. But maybe there is a way to claim that it is possible not to consider the possible objections of the future individuals in one case and not in the other. It might be possible to say that if a whole generation denies the importance of some talents for some activities it is heavily not probable that there will be in the future people admiring those activities. But this answer is not plausible. First, it has to be proved that it really indicates a difference between the state-choice and the parents-choice, because it would be possible to say that it is very not probable that children develops some preferences despite those of the parents, the same as it’s not probable that new generations develop tastes totally disagreed by oldest. Furthermore, it’s possible to say that this kind of argument, most probably, must invert Ackerman’s statements, and not confirm them (i.e. that the right statement must be that it is more plausible to leave free choice to families than to society). It is true that our preferences are in great part socially determined, but it is also true that the relevant community in the determination of our system of preferences is not the whole society, but our close community, in particular the family (at least in a non totalitarian state). Second, it doesn’t seem plausible to argue that the not acceptance by the present generation (either the whole society, or the family) can guarantee that some values and preferences will not exist in the future. Dissidents are always possible, the renaissance of old fashions can’t be excluded. A further difficulty is represented by the problem whether it is permissible to decide which values and preferences will be accepted in the future. The presupposition of the answer I am discussing at the moment is that there will not be an injustice if the society selects some talents, eliminating some of them together with the related preferences. Is this an acceptable procedure? Imagine that it is really possible not only to choose the talents, but also the preferences. The state or the family can decide that the future person will have some talents and not others, and will prefer to have the former and not the latter. Is this legitimate? Ackerman doesn’t discuss about this, but it might seem that there’s no injustice in this case. The future person will never say: ´I want to be a Ronaldo and you made a Pavarotti of me!ª, he will simply never prefer to be a Ronaldo. Nonetheless, there is an injustice. The future person could say: ´Why did you choose to limit my opportunity of choice? Why did you deprive me of an opportunity that you had?ª. The only possible reply is to project future persons in such a way as to project their talents, their preferences and also the absence of a wish to not have had limited the range of possible preferences. I will not discuss whether this is possible from the standpoint of Ackerman’s theory, but this is surely not an attractive prospective for a liberal theory.

A conclusion seems to follow that from the premise of Ackerman’s theory of justice there must be a complete denial of the application genetic engineering to human beings (both in relation to families and societies). But is this true, is this drastic conclusion necessary?

A possibility of permission arises if we add a further condition for legitimizing the application of genetic engineering, a condition that eliminates (or creates a reasonable expectation that there will be eliminated) injustices. Not only is permissible to select in accordance to the preferences of the actual generation, but also in accordance with the reasonable expectation that there will not be a frustration of the preferences of the members of the future generation. This condition reduces the range of choices to those applications of genetic engineering that are needed in order to eliminate those defects that doesn’t permit to an individual to become a citizen, and a determinate class of handicaps that are maintained as not desirable by anybody (for example, the predisposition to a mortal illness), and to application of genetic engineering in order to add some talents without deleting other talents. If the parents or the state decide to add a talent for music, without eliminating a talent for a sport, the interested future citizen will not have a reason for protesting, because nothing has been taken from what he or she has got by natural coincidence.

Therefore, the rule is: genetic engineering is legitimate if and only if (i) it is needed in order to eliminate those defects that doesn’t permit to an individual to become a citizen, (ii) in order to eliminate some generally recognized handicaps, and (iii) in order to add talents without eliminating other talents. This rule permits applications of genetic engineering in accordance to Ackerman’s theory of justice.

Now let’s go back to Harris’ argument by analogy to see whether the argument that is in accordance with Ackerman’s theory is in accordance with commonly accepted intuitions, too. Harris said that it is permissible for parents to choose which children’s talents they want to develop and that it follows by analogy that the same must be allowed to them by applying genetic engineering. This conflicts with the Ackermanian argument, at least in relation to the choice made by the parents.

But does Harris’ statement capture a common attitude toward education? It doesn’t seem to me. It is true that parents can make decisions that will influence the future of their children. Let’s say, when the child is at the age of 8, parents can decide whether the hobby of their child is swimming of playing piano. They make this choice because somebody must make a choice, and the child is not able to do this. But from this it doesn’t follow that they can make a choice about the totality of the future the child. On the contrary, as reflected also by the schools system, they can’t. The school system is so organized that the younger is a child (and less able to make choices) the more general is the character of the education, and the specialization of the education (the specificity of talents to be nurtured) increases as much as the ability to choose of the child increases. At a secondary school it is higher than at a primary school, at university higher than at a secondary school.

Therefore, the common practice speaks in favor of the Ackermanian rule, and not in favor of Harris. But a further problem can arise. The whole argumentation until now was influenced by the problem of possible injustices made to an individual by taking him or her some genetic predisposition he or she would like to have. The injustice, as seen, according to Ackerman’s argumentation is revealed by the future’s citizens protest because of having been deprived of something he or she wanted to have. However, another kind of protest is possible. The future citizen might say: ´You had the possibility to give me something I want to have (a talent for being a wonderful mathematician) and you didn’t!ª Why is this protest not a valid protest, contrary to the first one? If this protest would be a valid one, than both an application of genetic engineering and a not application of it would risk to make an injustice. An appeal to a bayesian calculation would not be a solution for the trouble, because the desires of the future person could be so many, and so radically different, that this calculation would be impossible to make (with the exceptions of the radical cases I spoke about earlier). The implication seems to be that because of the fact an injustice is possible in both cases, it is morally neutral for the parents to decide about the best thing to do: it would be their free choice whether to apply genetic engineering or not (with the exception of some radical situations).

A solution for the problem might be to affirm the moral distinction between acts and omission. By doing wrong we do something worse than by not doing well, therefore, when there is a dilemma, it is preferable not to risk to do something wrong than not to risk to omit to do well. However, this is a dubious solution, because a general appeal to the rule is dubious, in particular in relation to parents duties toward their children, where frequently it could be possible to see that omitting to do well could be as wrong as doing something wrong. Ackerman himself has a solution for the problem. It is the statement that everybody has the right not to be damaged, and sometimes the right to be helped (for example in the case of some redistribution of welfare in the society, at least that one needed in order to enter life with equal chances like other citizens), but nobody has the right to get everything that he or she wants. Parents and the society as a whole have the duty to give to their children and to future members at least fair chances - comparable to those of other people - in their life (in accordance to Ackerman’s theory of justice, comparable also at least to those they had when beginning their lives), but not everything each child or each future member of the society can desire. This is the reason why the future children can’t appropriately protest for an injustice by saying: ´I want to have a genetic predisposition to be a model, and you didn’t give this opportunity to me!ª. In this specific case, it is unjust to do a damage, but not to omit to do something well, the specific well consisting in satisfying all possible desires of future members of a society or of a family.

I’ll end the paper by trying to see what follows from the Ackermanian rule in relation to the problem of clonation. Clonation represents a case of total determination of the future’s being genetic features. The nucleus of a somatic cell is introduced in an egg cell without the nucleus. The embryo will have exactly the same genetic features of the individual who gave the nucleus of the somatic cell. Of course, there is a great number of moral objections to clonation. Three of them are relevant from the standpoint of the previous discussion in this paper: (i) By the application of clonation, the individual looses his or her individuality, because he or she is a copy of another individual; (ii) The right to self-determination is compromised, because the individual is projected for a strictly determined purpose, which limits the options that the individual can choose; (iii) Clonation supports the idea that some beings can dominate other beings as much as having the right to project the structure of their life.

The first argument is clearly wrong. What can happen by clonation usually happens in a natural way in the creation of twins. However, in this case nobody says that the individuality of each of them is compromised. Furthermore, it is possible to say that there will be even greater differences between clones than between twins, because of the generation gap and because of living in at least partly (frequently very) different situations.

The (ii) and the (iii) argument (which in fact are connected) are too much severe in judging clonation. This practice doesn’t necessarily imply that it is permissible to project anybody for a strictly determined purpose, neither that some beings have the right to project the structure of other being’s life. In order to permit this, something more than clonation would be needed (a total control on the education and the life activities - at least in the younger age - of these beings). However, the determination of the genetic features seems to be enough, from the standpoint of what has been said in the discussion of Ackerman’s argument. Ackerman’s argument shows that it is unjust toward the future person to permit that the parents (and as I have further shown the state) select the features of future individuals (with the indicated exceptions). Clonation might seem paradigmatically a case in which some genetic features are preferred to others, imposed to the individual who seems to be possibly deprived of some features he or she could want to have. Nevertheless, there is an important difference respect the case discussed by Ackerman. In that situation, there were already individuals with some genetic features, and than these features were modified. Future persons will have the right to protest, because they have lost something they already had. The situation is different in the case of clonation. In this case, the individual would have never existed without the clonation, which was the only possible way for him or her to come to existence. In other cases of genetic engineering, the alternative is whether to leave the individual to develop with his or her natural genetic features, or to modify his or her genetic features. In the case of clonation the alternative is whether to create this new life or not. In order to say that clonation is unjust, it would be necessary to say that for the individual it would be better not to exist, than to exist by clonation. This would obviously be an absurd statement, because nothing says that a clone can’t live a life that is worth deserving.

The same reason that doesn’t permit genetic manipulations in general (with the indicated exceptions) and permits clonation, doesn’t permit various cases of instrumental reproduction. I refer to cases like this. Somebody might say to his or her child: ´You can’t protest because I’m selling you as a slave, because this selling is the reason I created you. If I didn’t desired to sell you as a slave you wouldn’t exist at all. But it is preferable for you to exist as a slave than not to exist at allª. The problem of this statement is that the ‘condition of existence’ in it, and the ‘condition of existence’ in the case of clonation means something different. In the former case it indicates a subjective condition of the parents, something that is possible to eliminate even without eliminating the existence of the child. In the case of clonation, the ‘condition of existence’ is necessary, it can’t be eliminate without eliminating the existence of the child. In this sense, the future citizen can’t legitimately protest against it, even though the one whose parents want to sell as a slave can do this.

Doc.dr.sc. Elvio Baccarini
Vjenceslava Novaka 12
51000 Rijeka, Croatia
elvio.baccarini@ri.tel.hr